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true。
And so I very clearly recognise that the certainty and
truth of all knowledge depends alone on the knowledge of the
true God； in so much that； before I knew Him； I could not have
a perfect knowledge of any other thing。 And now that I know
Him I have the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge of an
infinitude of things； not only of those which relate to God
Himself and other intellectual matters； but also of those
which pertain to corporeal nature in so far as it is the
object of pure mathematics ＇which have no concern with whether
it exists or not＇。
Meditation VI。
Of the Existence of Material Things； and of the real
distinction between the Soul and Body of Man。
Nothing further now remains but to inquire whether
material things exist。 And certainly I at least know that
these may exist in so far as they are considered as the
objects of pure mathematics； since in this aspect I perceive
them clearly and distinctly。 For there is no doubt that God
possesses the power to produce everything that I am capable of
perceiving with distinctness； and I have never deemed that
anything was impossible for Him； unless I found a
contradiction in attempting to conceive it clearly。 Further；
the faculty of imagination which I possess； and of which；
experience tells me； I make use when I apply myself to the
consideration of material things； is capable of persuading me
of their existence； for when I attentively consider what
imagination is； I find that it is nothing but a certain
application of the faculty of knowledge to the body which is
immediately present to it； and which therefore exists。
And to render this quite clear； I remark in the first
place the difference that exists between the imagination and
pure intellection ＇or conception23＇。 For example； when I
imagine a triangle； I do not conceive it only as a figure
prehended by three lines； but I also apprehend24 these
three lines as present by the power and inward vision of my
mind；25 and this is what I call imagining。 But if I desire to
think of a chiliagon； I certainly conceive truly that it is a
figure posed of a thousand sides； just as easily as I
conceive of a triangle that it is a figure of three sides
only； but I cannot in any way imagine the thousand sides of a
chiliagon ＇as I do the three sides of a triangle＇； nor do I；
so to speak； regard them as present ＇with the eyes of my
mind＇。 And although in accordance with the habit I have
formed of always employing the aid of my imagination when I
think of corporeal things； it may happen that in imagining a
chiliagon I confusedly represent to myself some figure； yet it
is very evident that this figure is not a chiliagon； since it
in no way differs from that which I represent to myself when I
think of a myriagon or any other many…sided figure； nor does
it serve my purpose in discovering the properties which go to
form the distinction between a chiliagon and other polygons。
But if the question turns upon a pentagon； it is quite true
that I can conceive its figure as well as that of a chiliagon
without the help of my imagination； but I can also imagine it
by applying the attention of my mind to each of its five
sides； and at the same time to the space which they enclose。
And thus I clearly recognise that I have need of a particular
effort of mind in order to effect the act of imagination； such
as I do not require in order to understand； and this
particular effort of mind clearly manifests the difference
which exists between imagination and pure intellection。26
I remark besides that this power of imagination which is
in one； inasmuch as it differs from the power of
understanding； is in no wise a necessary element in my nature；
or in ＇my essence； that is to say； in＇ the essence of my mind；
for although I did not possess it I should doubtless ever
remain the same as I now am； from which it appears that we
might conclude that it depends on something which differs from
me。 And I easily conceive that if some body exists with which
my mind is conjoined and united in such a way that it can
apply itself to consider it when it pleases； it may be that by
this means it can imagine corporeal objects； so that this mode
of thinking differs from pure intellection only inasmuch as
mind in its intellectual activity in some manner turns on
itself； and considers some of the ideas which it possesses in
itself； while in imagining it turns towards the body； and
there beholds in it something conformable to the idea which it
has either conceived of itself or perceived by the senses。 I
easily understand； I say； that the imagination could be thus
constituted if it is true that body exists； and because I can
discover no other convenient mode of explaining it； I
conjecture with probability that body does exist； but this is
only with probability； and although I examine all things with
care； I nevertheless do not find that from this distinct idea
of corporeal nature； which I have in my imagination； I can
derive any argument from which there will necessarily be
deduced the existence of body。
But I am in the habit of imagining many other things
besides this corporeal nature which is the object of pure
mathematics； to wit； the colours； sounds； scents； pain； and
other such things； although less distinctly。 And inasmuch as
I perceive these things much better through the senses； by the
medium of which； and by the memory； they seem to have reached
my imagination； I believe that； in order to examine them more
conveniently； it is right that I should at the same time
investigate the nature of sense perception； and that I should
see if from the ideas which I apprehend by this mode of
thought； which I call feeling； I cannot derive some certain
proof of the existence of corporeal objects。
And first of all I shall recall to my memory those
matters which I hitherto held to be true； as having perceived
them through the senses； and the foundations on which my
belief has rested； in the next place I shall examine the
reasons which have since obliged me to place them in