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capable of being inscribed in the circle； it is in no wise
necessary that I should think that all quadrilateral figures
are of this number； on the contrary； I cannot even pretend
that this is the case； so long as I do not desire to accept
anything which I cannot conceive clearly and distinctly。 And
in consequence there is a great difference between the false
suppositions such as this； and the true ideas born within me；
the first and principal of which is that of God。 For really I
discern in many ways that this idea is not something
factitious； and depending solely on my thought； but that it is
the image of a true and immutable nature； first of all；
because I cannot conceive anything but God himself to whose
essence existence ＇necessarily＇ pertains； in the second place
because it is not possible for me to conceive two or more Gods
in this same position； and； granted that there is one such God
who now exists； I see clearly that it is necessary that He
should have existed from all eternity； and that He must exist
eternally； and finally； because I know an infinitude of other
properties in God； none of which I can either diminish or
change。
For the rest； whatever proof or argument I avail myself
of； we must always return to the point that it is only those
things which we conceive clearly and distinctly that have the
power of persuading me entirely。 And although amongst the
matters which I conceive of in this way； some indeed are
manifestly obvious to all； while others only manifest
themselves to those who consider them closely and examine them
attentively； still； after they have once been discovered； the
latter are not esteemed as any less certain than the former。
For example； in the case of every right…angled triangle；
although it does not so manifestly appear that the square of
the base is equal to the squares of the two other sides as
that this base is opposite to the greatest angle； still； when
this has once been apprehended； we are just as certain of its
truth as of the truth of the other。 And as regards God； if my
mind were not pre…occupied with prejudices； and if my thought
did not find itself on all hands diverted by the continual
pressure of sensible things； there would be nothing which I
could know more immediately and more easily than Him。 For is
there anything more manifest than that there is a God； that is
to say； a Supreme Being； to whose essence alone existence
pertains？21
And although for a firm grasp of this truth I have need
of a strenuous application of mind； at present I not only feel
myself to be as assured of it as of all that I hold as most
certain； but I also remark that the certainty of all other
things depends on it so absolutely； that without this
knowledge it is impossible ever to know anything perfectly。
For although I am of such a nature that as long as22 I
understand anything very clearly and distinctly； I am
naturally impelled to believe it to be true； yet because I am
also of such a nature that I cannot have my mind constantly
fixed on the same object in order to perceive it clearly； and
as I often recollect having formed a past judgment without at
the same time properly recollecting the reasons that led me to
make it； it may happen meanwhile that other reasons present
themselves to me； which would easily cause me to change my
opinion； if I were ignorant of the facts of the existence of
God； and thus I should have no true and certain knowledge； but
only vague and vacillating opinions。 Thus； for example； when
I consider the nature of a ＇rectilinear＇ triangle； I who have
some little knowledge of the principles of geometry recognise
quite clearly that the three angles are equal to two right
angles； and it is not possible for me not to believe this so
long as I apply my mind to its demonstration； but so soon as I
abstain from attending to the proof； although I still
recollect having clearly prehended it； it may easily occur
that I e to doubt its truth； if I am ignorant of there
being a God。 For I can persuade myself of having been so
constituted by nature that I can easily deceive myself even in
those matters which I believe myself to apprehend with the
greatest evidence and certainty； especially when I recollect
that I have frequently judged matters to be true and certain
which other reasons have afterwards impelled me to judge to be
altogether false。
But after I have recognised that there is a God￥because
at the same time I have also recognised that all things depend
upon Him； and that He is not a deceiver； and from that have
inferred that what I perceive clearly and distinctly cannot
fail to be true￥although I no longer pay attention to the
reasons for which I have judged this to be true； provided that
I recollect having clearly and distinctly perceived it no
contrary reason can be brought forward which could ever cause
me to doubt of its truth； and thus I have a true and certain
knowledge of it。 And this same knowledge extends likewise to
all other things which I recollect having formerly
demonstrated； such as the truths of geometry and the like； for
what can be alleged against them to cause me to place them in
doubt？ Will it be said that my nature is such as to cause me
to be frequently deceived？ But I already know that I cannot
be deceived in the judgment whose grounds I know clearly。
Will it be said that I formerly held many things to be true
and certain which I have afterwards recognised to be false？
But I had not had any clear and distinct knowledge of these
things； and not as yet knowing the rule whereby I assure
myself of the truth； I had been impelled to give my assent
from reasons which I have since recognised to be less strong
than I had at the time imagined them to be。 What further
objection can then be raised？ That possibly I am dreaming （an
objection I myself made a little while ago）； or that all the
thoughts which I now have are no more true than the phantasies
of my dreams？ But even though I slept the case would be the
same； for all that is clearly present to my mind is absolutely
true。
And so I very clearly recognise that the certainty and
t