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only to some other representation thereof； be that an intuition or
itself a conception。 A judgement； therefore； is the mediate
cognition of an object； consequently the representation of a
representation of it。 In every judgement there is a conception which
applies to； and is valid for many other conceptions； and which among
these prehends also a given representation； this last being
immediately connected with an object。 For example； in the judgement…
〃All bodies are divisible；〃 our conception of divisible applies to
various other conceptions； among these； however； it is here
particularly applied to the conception of body； and this conception of
body relates to certain phenomena which occur to us。 These objects；
therefore； are mediately represented by the conception of
divisibility。 All judgements； accordingly； are functions of unity in
our representations； inasmuch as； instead of an immediate； a higher
representation； which prises this and various others； is used for
our cognition of the object； and thereby many possible cognitions
are collected into one。 But we can reduce all acts of the
understanding to judgements； so that understanding may be
represented as the faculty of judging。 For it is； according to what
has been said above； a faculty of thought。 Now thought is cognition by
means of conceptions。 But conceptions； as predicates of possible
judgements； relate to some representation of a yet undetermined
object。 Thus the conception of body indicates something… for
example； metal… which can be cognized by means of that conception。
It is therefore a conception； for the reason alone that other
representations are contained under it； by means of which it can
relate to objects。 It is therefore the predicate to a possible
judgement； for example： 〃Every metal is a body。〃 All the functions
of the understanding therefore can be discovered； when we can
pletely exhibit the functions of unity in judgements。 And that this
may be effected very easily； the following section will show。
SECTION II。 Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in
Judgements。 SS 5
If we abstract all the content of a judgement； and consider only the
intellectual form thereof； we find that the function of thought in a
judgement can be brought under four heads； of which each contains
three momenta。 These may be conveniently represented in the
following table：
1
Quantity of judgements
Universal
Particular
Singular
2 3
Quality Relation
Affirmative Categorical
Negative Hypothetical
Infinite Disjunctive
4
Modality
Problematical
Assertorical
Apodeictical
As this division appears to differ in some； though not essential
points； from the usual technique of logicians； the following
observations； for the prevention of otherwise possible
misunderstanding； will not be without their use。
1。 Logicians say； with justice； that in the use of judgements in
syllogisms； singular judgements may be treated like universal ones。
For； precisely because a singular judgement has no extent at all；
its predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is contained in the
conception of the subject and be excluded from the rest。 The predicate
is valid for the whole conception just as if it were a general
conception； and had extent； to the whole of which the predicate
applied。 On the other hand； let us pare a singular with a general
judgement； merely as a cognition； in regard to quantity。 The
singular judgement relates to the general one； as unity to infinity；
and is therefore in itself essentially different。 Thus； if we estimate
a singular judgement （judicium singulare） not merely according to
its intrinsic validity as a judgement； but also as a cognition
generally； according to its quantity in parison with that of
other cognitions； it is then entirely different from a general
judgement （judicium mune）； and in a plete table of the momenta
of thought deserves a separate place… though； indeed； this would not
be necessary in a logic limited merely to the consideration of the use
of judgements in reference to each other。
2。 In like manner； in transcendental logic； infinite must be
distinguished from affirmative judgements； although in general logic
they are rightly enough classed under affirmative。 General logic
abstracts all content of the predicate （though it be negative）； and
only considers whether the said predicate be affirmed or denied of the
subject。 But transcendental logic considers also the worth or
content of this logical affirmation… an affirmation by means of a
merely negative predicate； and inquires how much the sum total of
our cognition gains by this affirmation。 For example； if I say of
the soul； 〃It is not mortal〃… by this negative judgement I should at
least ward off error。 Now； by the proposition； 〃The soul is not
mortal；〃 I have； in respect of the logical form； really affirmed；
inasmuch as I thereby place the soul in the unlimited sphere of
immortal beings。 Now； because of the whole sphere of possible
existences； the mortal occupies one part； and the immortal the
other； neither more nor less is affirmed by the proposition than
that the soul is one among the infinite multitude of things which
remain over； when I take away the whole mortal part。 But by this
proceeding we acplish only this much； that the infinite sphere of
all possible existences is in so far limited that the mortal is
excluded from it； and the soul is placed in the remaining part of
the extent of this sphere。 But this part remains； notwithstanding this
exception； infinite； and more and more parts may be taken away from
the whole sphere； without in the slightest degree thereby augm