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free will； is related to practical ethics； which considers these
laws under all the impediments of feelings； inclinations； and passions
to which men are more or less subjected； and which never can furnish
us with a true and demonstrated science； because it； as well as
applied logic； requires empirical and psychological principles。
II。 Of Transcendental Logic。
General logic； as we have seen； makes abstraction of all content
of cognition； that is； of all relation of cognition to its object； and
regards only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to each
other； that is； the form of thought in general。 But as we have both
pure and empirical intuitions （as transcendental aesthetic proves）； in
like manner a distinction might be drawn between pure and empirical
thought （of objects）。 In this case； there would exist a kind of logic；
in which we should not make abstraction of all content of cognition；
for or logic which should prise merely the laws of pure thought （of
an object）； would of course exclude all those cognitions which were of
empirical content。 This kind of logic would also examine the origin of
our cognitions of objects； so far as that origin cannot be ascribed to
the objects themselves； while； on the contrary； general logic has
nothing to do with the origin of our cognitions； but contemplates
our representations； be they given primitively a priori in
ourselves； or be they only of empirical origin； solely according to
the laws which the understanding observes in employing them in the
process of thought； in relation to each other。 Consequently； general
logic treats of the form of the understanding only； which can be
applied to representations； from whatever source they may have arisen。
And here I shall make a remark； which the reader must bear well in
mind in the course of the following considerations； to wit； that not
every cognition a priori； but only those through which we cognize that
and how certain representations （intuitions or conceptions） are
applied or are possible only a priori； that is to say； the a priori
possibility of cognition and the a priori use of it are
transcendental。 Therefore neither is space； nor any a priori
geometrical determination of space； a transcendental Representation；
but only the knowledge that such a representation is not of
empirical origin； and the possibility of its relating to objects of
experience； although itself a priori； can be called transcendental。 So
also； the application of space to objects in general would be
transcendental； but if it be limited to objects of sense it is
empirical。 Thus； the distinction of the transcendental and empirical
belongs only to the critique of cognitions； and does not concern the
relation of these to their object。
Accordingly； in the expectation that there may perhaps be
conceptions which relate a priori to objects； not as pure or
sensuous intuitions； but merely as acts of pure thought （which are
therefore conceptions； but neither of empirical nor aesthetical
origin）… in this expectation； I say； we form to ourselves； by
anticipation； the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational
cognition； by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely a
priori。 A science of this kind； which should determine the origin； the
extent； and the objective validity of such cognitions； must be
called transcendental logic； because it has not； like general logic；
to do with the laws of understanding and reason in relation to
empirical as well as pure rational cognitions without distinction； but
concerns itself with these only in an a priori relation to objects。
III。 Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic。
The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a
corner； so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms
or confess their ignorance； and consequently the vanity of their whole
art； is this： 〃What is truth？〃 The definition of the word truth； to
wit； 〃the accordance of the cognition with its object；〃 is presupposed
in the question； but we desire to be told； in the answer to it； what
is the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition。
To know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a
strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence。 For if a question be
in itself absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer； it is
attended with the danger… not to mention the shame that falls upon the
person who proposes it… of seducing the unguarded listener into making
absurd answers； and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle
of one （as the ancients said） 〃milking the he…goat； and the other
holding a sieve。〃
If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its
object； this object must be； ipso facto； distinguished from all
others； for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the object
to which it relates； although it contains something which may be
affirmed of other objects。 Now an universal criterion of truth would
be that which is valid for all cognitions； without distinction of
their objects。 But it is evident that since； in the case of such a
criterion； we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition （that
is； of all relation to its object）； and truth relates precisely to
this content； it must be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth
of this content of cognition； and that； accordingly； a sufficient； and
at the same time universal； test of truth cannot possibly be found。 As
we have already termed the content of a cognition its matter； we shall
say： 〃Of the truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter； no
universal test can be demanded； because such a demand is
self…contradictory。〃
On the other hand； with regard to our cognition in respect of its
mere form （excluding all content）； it is equally manifest that
logic； in so far as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of
the understanding； must in these very laws present us with criteria of
truth。 Whatever contradicts these rules is false； because thereby
the understanding is made to contradict its own universal laws of
thought； that is； to contradict itself。 These