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happiness； is a practically necessary idea of reason。
Practical laws； in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions；
that is； subjective principles； are termed maxims。 The judgements of
moral according to in its purity and ultimate results are framed
according ideas； the observance of its laws； according to according to
maxims。
The whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims； but
this is impossible； unless with the moral law； which is a mere idea；
reason connects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct
which is in conformity with the moral law an issue either in this or
in another life； which is in exact conformity with our highest aims。
Thus； without a God and without a world； invisible to us now； but
hoped for； the glorious ideas of morality are； indeed； objects of
approbation and of admiration； but cannot be the springs of purpose
and action。 For they do not satisfy all the aims which are natural
to every rational being； and which are determined a priori by pure
reason itself； and necessary。
Happiness alone is； in the view of reason； far from being the
plete good。 Reason does not approve of it （however much inclination
may desire it）； except as united with desert。 On the other hand；
morality alone； and with it； mere desert； is likewise far from being
the plete good。 To make it plete； he who conducts himself in a
manner not unworthy of happiness； must be able to hope for the
possession of happiness。 Even reason； unbiased by private ends； or
interested considerations； cannot judge otherwise； if it puts itself
in the place of a being whose business it is to dispense all happiness
to others。 For in the practical idea both points are essentially
bined； though in such a way that participation in happiness is
rendered possible by the moral disposition； as its condition； and
not conversely； the moral disposition by the prospect of happiness。
For a disposition which should require the prospect of happiness as
its necessary condition would not be moral； and hence also would not
be worthy of plete happiness… a happiness which； in the view of
reason； recognizes no limitation but such as arises from our own
immoral conduct。
Happiness； therefore； in exact proportion with the morality of
rational beings （whereby they are made worthy of happiness）；
constitutes alone the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely
must transport ourselves according to the mands of pure but
practical reason。 This world is； it is true； only an intelligible
world； for of such a systematic unity of ends as it requires； the
world of sense gives us no hint。 Its reality can be based on nothing
else but the hypothesis of a supreme original good。 In it
independent reason； equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme
cause； founds； maintains； and fulfils the universal order of things；
with the most perfect teleological harmony； however much this order
may be hidden from us in the world of sense。
This moral theology has the peculiar advantage； in contrast with
speculative theology； of leading inevitably to the conception of a
sole； perfect； and rational First Cause； whereof speculative
theology does not give us any indication on objective grounds； far
less any convincing evidence。 For we find neither in transcendental
nor in natural theology； however far reason may lead us in these；
any ground to warrant us in assuming the existence of one only
Being； which stands at the head of all natural causes； and on which
these are entirely dependent。 On the other band； if we take our
stand on moral unity as a necessary law of the universe； and from this
point of view consider what is necessary to give this law adequate
efficiency and； for us； obligatory force； we must e to the
conclusion that there is one only supreme will； which prehends
all these laws in itself。 For how； under different wills； should we
find plete unity of ends？ This will must be omnipotent； that all
nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to it；
omniscient； that it may have knowledge of the most secret feelings and
their moral worth； omnipresent； that it may be at hand to supply every
necessity to which the highest weal of the world may give rise；
eternal； that this harmony of nature and liberty may never fail； and
so on。
But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences…
which； as mere nature； is only a world of sense； but； as a system of
freedom of volition； may be termed an intelligible； that is； moral
world （regnum gratiae）… leads inevitably also to the teleological
unity of all things which constitute this great whole； according to
universal natural laws… just as the unity of the former is according
to universal and necessary moral laws… and unites the practical with
the speculative reason。 The world must be represented as having
originated from an idea； if it is to harmonize with that use of reason
without which we cannot even consider ourselves as worthy of reason…
namely； the moral use； which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme
good。 Hence the investigation of nature receives a teleological
direction； and bees； in its widest extension； physico…theology。 But
this； taking its rise in moral order as a unity founded on the essence
of freedom； and not accidentally instituted by external mands；
establishes the teleological view of nature on grounds which must be
inseparably connected with the internal possibility of things。 This
gives rise to a transcendental theology； which takes the ideal of
the highest ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity；
and this principle connects all things according to universal and
necessary natural laws； because all things have their origin in the
absolute necessity of the one only Primal Being。
What use can we make of our understanding； even in respect of
experience； if we do not propose ends to ourselves？ But the highest
ends are those of morality； and it is only pure reason that can give
us the knowledge of these。 Though supplied with these； and putting
ourselves under their guidance； we can make no teleological use of the
knowledge of nature； as regards cognition； unless