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Now what is the cause； in these transcendental arguments； of the
dialectical； but natural； illusion； which connects the conceptions
of necessity and supreme reality； and hypostatizes that which cannot
be anything but an idea？ What is the cause of this unavoidable step on
the part of reason； of admitting that some one among all existing
things must be necessary； while it falls back from the assertion of
the existence of such a being as from an abyss？ And how does reason
proceed to explain this anomaly to itself； and from the wavering
condition of a timid and reluctant approbation… always again
withdrawn… arrive at a calm and settled insight into its cause？
It is something very remarkable that； on the supposition that
something exists； I cannot avoid the inference that something exists
necessarily。 Upon this perfectly natural… but not on that account
reliable… inference does the cosmological argument rest。 But； let me
form any conception whatever of a thing； I find that I cannot cogitate
the existence of the thing as absolutely necessary； and that nothing
prevents me… be the thing or being what it may… from cogitating its
non…existence。 I may thus be obliged to admit that all existing things
have a necessary basis； while I cannot cogitate any single or
individual thing as necessary。 In other words； I can never plete
the regress through the conditions of existence； without admitting the
existence of a necessary being； but； on the other hand； I cannot
make a mencement from this being。
If I must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the basis of
existing things； and yet am not permitted to cogitate any individual
thing as in itself necessary； the inevitable inference is that
necessity and contingency are not properties of things themselves…
otherwise an internal contradiction would result； that consequently
neither of these principles are objective； but merely subjective
principles of reason… the one requiring us to seek for a necessary
ground for everything that exists； that is； to be satisfied with no
other explanation than that which is plete a priori； the other
forbidding us ever to hope for the attainment of this pleteness；
that is； to regard no member of the empirical world as
unconditioned。 In this mode of viewing them； both principles； in their
purely heuristic and regulative character； and as concerning merely
the formal interest of reason； are quite consistent with each other。
The one says： 〃You must philosophize upon nature；〃 as if there existed
a necessary primal basis of all existing things； solely for the
purpose of introducing systematic unity into your knowledge； by
pursuing an idea of this character… a foundation which is
arbitrarily admitted to be ultimate； while the other warns you to
consider no individual determination； concerning the existence of
things； as such an ultimate foundation； that is； as absolutely
necessary； but to keep the way always open for further progress in the
deduction； and to treat every determination as determined by some
other。 But if all that we perceive must be regarded as conditionally
necessary； it is impossible that anything which is empirically given
should be absolutely necessary。
It follows from this that you must accept the absolutely necessary
as out of and beyond the world； inasmuch as it is useful only as a
principle of the highest possible unity in experience； and you
cannot discover any such necessary existence in the would； the
second rule requiring you to regard all empirical causes of unity as
themselves deduced。
The philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of nature as
contingent； while matter was considered by them； in accordance with
the judgement of the mon reason of mankind； as primal and
necessary。 But if they had regarded matter； not relatively… as the
substratum of phenomena； but absolutely and in itself… as an
independent existence； this idea of absolute necessity would have
immediately disappeared。 For there is nothing absolutely connecting
reason with such an existence； on the contrary； it can annihilate it
in thought； always and without self…contradiction。 But in thought
alone lay the idea of absolute necessity。 A regulative principle must；
therefore； have been at the foundation of this opinion。 In fact；
extension and impenetrability… which together constitute our
conception of matter… form the supreme empirical principle of the
unity of phenomena； and this principle； in so far as it is empirically
unconditioned； possesses the property of a regulative principle。
But； as every determination of matter which constitutes what is real
in it… and consequently impenetrability… is an effect； which must have
a cause； and is for this reason always derived； the notion of matter
cannot harmonize with the idea of a necessary being； in its
character of the principle of all derived unity。 For every one of
its real properties； being derived； must be only conditionally
necessary； and can therefore be annihilated in thought； and thus the
whole existence of matter can be so annihilated or suppressed。 If this
were not the case； we should have found in the world of phenomena
the highest ground or condition of unity… which is impossible；
according to the second regulative principle。 It follows that
matter； and； in general； all that forms part of the world of sense；
cannot be a necessary primal being； nor even a principle of
empirical unity； but that this being or principle must have its
place assigned without the world。 And； in this way； we can proceed
in perfect confidence to deduce the phenomena of the world and their
existence from other phenomena； just as if there existed no
necessary being； and we can at the same time； strive without ceasing
towards the attainment of pleteness for our deduction； just as if
such a being… the supreme condition of all existences… were
presupposed by the mind。
These remarks will have made it evident to the reader that the ideal
of the Supreme Being； far from being an enouncement of the existence
of a being in itself necessary； is nothing more than a regulative
principle of reason； requiring us to regard all connection existing
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