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conception thereof。
Now the transcendental （subjective） reality at least of the pure
conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such
ideas by a necessary procedure of reason。 There must therefore be
syllogisms which contain no empirical premisses； and by means of which
we conclude from something that we do know； to something of which we
do not even possess a conception； to which we； nevertheless； by an
unavoidable illusion； ascribe objective reality。 Such arguments are；
as regards their result； rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms；
although indeed； as regards their origin； they are very well
entitled to the latter name； inasmuch as they are not fictions or
accidental products of reason； but are necessitated by its very
nature。 They are sophisms； not of men； but of pure reason herself；
from which the Wisest cannot free himself。 After long labour he may be
able to guard against the error； but he can never be thoroughly rid of
the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him。
Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds；
corresponding to the number of the ideas which their conclusions
present。 In the argument or syllogism of the first class； I
conclude； from the transcendental conception of the subject contains
no manifold； the absolute unity of the subject itself； of which I
cannot in this manner attain to a conception。 This dialectical
argument I shall call the transcendental paralogism。 The second
class of sophistical arguments is occupied with the transcendental
conception of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for
a given phenomenon； and I conclude； from the fact that I have always a
self…contradictory conception of the unconditioned synthetical unity
of the series upon one side； the truth of the opposite unity； of which
I have nevertheless no conception。 The condition of reason in these
dialectical arguments； I shall term the antinomy of pure reason。
Finally； according to the third kind of sophistical argument； I
conclude； from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in
general； in so far as they can be given； the absolute synthetical
unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general；
that is； from things which I do not know in their mere
transcendental conception； I conclude a being of all beings which I
know still less by means of a transcendental conception； and of
whose unconditioned necessity I can form no conception whatever。
This dialectical argument I shall call the ideal of pure reason。
CHAPTER I。 Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason。
The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in
respect of its form； be the content what it may。 But a
transcendental paralogism has a transcendental foundation； and
concludes falsely； while the form is correct and unexceptionable。 In
this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human
reason； and is the parent of an unavoidable； though not insoluble；
mental illusion。
We now e to a conception which was not inserted in the general
list of transcendental conceptions。 and yet must be reckoned with
them； but at the same time without in the least altering； or
indicating a deficiency in that table。 This is the conception； or；
if the term is preferred； the judgement； 〃I think。〃 But it is
readily perceived that this thought is as it were the vehicle of all
conceptions in general； and consequently of transcendental conceptions
also； and that it is therefore regarded as a transcendental
conception； although it can have no peculiar claim to be so ranked；
inasmuch as its only use is to indicate that all thought is
acpanied by consciousness。 At the same time； pure as this
conception is from empirical content （impressions of the senses）； it
enables us to distinguish two different kinds of objects。 〃I；〃 as
thinking； am an object of the internal sense； and am called soul。 That
which is an object of the external senses is called body。 Thus the
expression； 〃I；〃 as a thinking being； designates the object…matter
of psychology； which may be called 〃the rational doctrine of the
soul；〃 inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing of the
soul but what； independently of all experience （which determines me in
concreto）； may be concluded from this conception 〃I；〃 in so far as
it appears in all thought。
Now； the rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of
this kind。 For if the smallest empirical element of thought； if any
particular perception of my internal state； were to be introduced
among the grounds of cognition of this science； it would not be a
rational； but an empirical doctrine of the soul。 We have thus before
us a pretended science； raised upon the single proposition； 〃I think；〃
whose foundation or want of foundation we may very properly； and
agreeably with the nature of a transcendental philosophy； here
examine。 It ought not to be objected that in this proposition； which
expresses the perception of one's self； an internal experience is
asserted； and that consequently the rational doctrine of the soul
which is founded upon it； is not pure； but partly founded upon an
empirical principle。 For this internal perception is nothing more than
the mere apperception； 〃I think；〃 which in fact renders all
transcendental conceptions possible； in which we say； 〃I think
substance； cause； etc。〃 For internal experience in general and its
possibility； or perception in general； and its relation to other
perceptions； unless some particular distinction or determination
thereof is empirically given； cannot be regarded as empirical
cognition； but as cognition of the empirical； and belongs to the
investigation of the possibility of every experience； which is
certainly transcendental。 The smallest object of experience （for
example； only pleasure or pain）； that should be included in the
general representation of self…consciousness； would immediately change
the rational into an empirical psychology。
〃I think〃 is therefore the only text of rational psychology； from
which it must develop its whole system。 It is manifest that this
thought； when applied to an object （myself）； can contai