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and despised； the one； his having kept sheep in Thrace； which brought
him into contempt （it being well known to all； and considered a great
indignity by every one）； and the other； his having at the accession to
his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the
imperial seat； he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity
by having； through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire；
practised many cruelties； so that the whole world was moved to anger at
the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity。 First Africa
rebelled； then the Senate with all the people of Rome； and all Italy
conspired against him； to which may be added his own army： this latter；
besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it； were
disgusted with his cruelties； and fearing him less when they found so
many against him； murdered him。
I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus； Macrinus； or Julian； who； being
thoroughly contemptible； were quickly wiped out； but I will bring this
discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this
difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far
less degree； because； notwithstanding one has to give them some
indulgence； that is soon done； none of these princes have armies that
are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces； as were
the armies of the Roman Empire； and whereas it was then more necessary
to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people； it is now more
necessary to all princes； except the Turk and the Soldan； to satisfy the
people rather than the soldiers； because the people are the more
powerful。
From the above I have excepted the Turk； who always keeps round him
twelve infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the
security and strength of the kingdom； and it is necessary that； putting
aside every consideration for the people； he should keep them his
friends。 The kingdom of the Soldan is similar； being entirely in the
hands of soldiers； follows again that； without regard to the people； he
must keep them his friends。 But you must note that the state of the
Soldan is unlike all other principalities； for the reason that it is
like the Christian pontificate； which cannot be called either an
hereditary or a newly formed principality； because the sons of the old
prince not the heirs； but he who is elected to that position by those
who have authority； and the sons remain only noblemen。 And this being an
ancient custom； it cannot be called a new principality； because there
are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in new ones； for
although the prince is new； the constitution of the state is old； and it
is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary lord。
But returning to the subject of our discourse； I say that whoever will
consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been
fatal to the above…named emperors； and it will be recognized also how it
happened that； a number of them acting in one way and a number in
another； only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to
unhappy ones。 Because it would have been useless and dangerous for
Pertinax and Alexander； being new princes； to imitate Marcus； who was
heir to the principality； and likewise it would have been utterly
destructive to Caracalla； modus； and Maximinus to have imitated
Severus； they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in
his footsteps。 Therefore a prince； new to the principality； cannot
imitate the actions of Marcus； nor； again； is it necessary to follow
those of Severus； but he ought to take from Severus those parts which
are necessary to found his state； and from Marcus those which are proper
and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and firm。
CHAPTER XX
ARE FORTRESSES； AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT；
ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL？
1。 SOME princes； so as to hold securely the state； have disarmed their
subjects； others have kept their subject towns by factions； others have
fostered enmities against themselves； others have laid themselves out to
gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their
governments； some have built fortresses； some have overthrown and
destroyed them。 And although one cannot give a final judgment on all one
of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in
which a decision has to be made； nevertheless I will speak as
prehensively as the matter of itself will admit。
2。 There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects； rather
when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them； because； by
arming them； those arms bee yours； those men who were distrusted
bee faithful； and those who were faithful are kept so； and your
subjects bee your adherents。 And whereas all subjects cannot be
armed； yet when those whom you do arm are benefited； the others can be
handled more freely； and this difference in their treatment； which they
quite understand； makes the former your dependants； and the latter；
considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and
service should have the most reward； excuse you。 But when you disarm
them； you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them； either
for cowardice or for want of loyalty； and either of these opinions
breeds hatred against you。 And because you cannot remain unarmed； it
follows that you turn to mercenaries； which are of the character already
shown； even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to
defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects。 Therefore；
as I have said； a new prince in a new principality has always
distributed arms。 Histories are full of examples。 But when a prince
acquires a new state； which he adds as a province to his old one； then
it is necessary to disarm the men of that state； except those who have
been his adherents in acquiring it； and these again； with time and
opportunit