按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
without ever being indifferent。
From all this I recognise that the power of will which I
have received from God is not of itself the source of my
errors￥for it is very ample and very perfect of its kind￥any
more than is the power of understanding； for since I
understand nothing but by the power which God has given me for
understanding； there is no doubt that all that I understand； I
understand as I ought； and it is not possible that I err in
this。 Whence then e my errors？ They e from the sole
fact that since the will is much wider in its range and
pass than the understanding； I do not restrain it within
the same bounds； but extend it also to things which I do not
understand： and as the will is of itself indifferent to
these； it easily falls into error and sin； and chooses the
evil for the good； or the false for the true。
For example； when I lately examined whether anything
existed in the world； and found that from the very fact that I
considered this question it followed very clearly that I
myself existed； I could not prevent myself from believing that
a thing I so clearly conceived was true： not that I found
myself pelled to do so by some external cause； but simply
because from great clearness in my mind there followed a great
inclination of my will； and I believed this with so much the
greater freedom or spontaneity as I possessed the less
indifference towards it。 Now； on the contrary； I not only
know that I exist； inasmuch as I am a thinking thing； but a
certain representation of corporeal nature is also presented
to my mind； and it es to pass that I doubt whether this
thinking nature which is in me； or rather by which I am what I
am； differs from this corporeal nature； or whether both are
not simply the same thing； and I here suppose that I do not
yet know any reason to persuade me to adopt the one belief
rather than the other。 From this it follows that I am
entirely indifferent as to which of the two I affirm or deny；
or even whether I abstain from forming any judgment in the
matter。
And this indifference does not only extend to matters as
to which the understanding has no knowledge； but also in
general to all those which are not apprehended with perfect
clearness at the moment when the will is deliberating upon
them： for； however probable are the conjectures which render
me disposed to form a judgment respecting anything； the simple
knowledge that I have that those are conjectures alone and not
certain and indubitable reasons； suffices to occasion me to
judge the contrary。 Of this I have had great experience of
late when I set aside as false all that I had formerly held to
be absolutely true； for the sole reason that I remarked that
it might in some measure be doubted。
But if I abstain from giving my judgment on any thing
when I do not perceive it with sufficient clearness and
distinctness； it is plain that I act rightly and am not
deceived。 But if I determine to deny or affirm； I no longer
make use as I should of my free will； and if I affirm what is
not true； it is evident that I deceive myself； even though I
judge according to truth； this es about only by chance； and
I do not escape the blame of misusing my freedom； for the
light of nature teaches us that the knowledge of the
understanding should always precede the determination of the
will。 And it is in the misuse of the free will that the
privation which constitutes the characteristic nature of error
is met with。 Privation； I say； is found in the act； in so far
as it proceeds from me； but it is not found in the faculty
which I have received from God； nor even in the act in so far
as it depends on Him。
For I have certainly no cause to plain that God has
not given me an intelligence which is more powerful； or a
natural light which is stronger than that which I have
received from Him； since it is proper to the finite
understanding not to prehend a multitude of things； and it
is proper to a created understanding to be finite； on the
contrary； I have every reason to render thanks to God who owes
me nothing and who has given me all the perfections I possess；
and I should be far from charging Him with injustice； and with
having deprived me of； or wrongfully withheld from me； these
perfections which He has not bestowed upon me。
I have further no reason to plain that He has given me
a will more ample than my understanding； for since the will
consists only of one single element； and is so to speak
indivisible； it appears that its nature is such that nothing
can be abstracted from it ＇without destroying it＇； and
certainly the more prehensive it is found to be； the more
reason I have to render gratitude to the giver。
And； finally； I must also not plain that God concurs
with me in forming the acts of the will； that is the judgment
in which I go astray； because these acts are entirely true and
good； inasmuch as they depend on God； and in a certain sense
more perfection accrues to my nature from the fact that I can
form them； than if I could not do so。 As to the privation in
which alone the formal reason of error or sin consists； it has
no need of any concurrence from God； since it is not a thing
＇or an existence＇； and since it is not related to God as to a
cause； but should be termed merely a negation ＇according to
the significance given to these words in the Schools＇。 For in
fact it is not an imperfection in God that He has given me the
liberty to give or withhold my assent from certain things as
to which He has not placed a clear and distinct knowledge in
my understanding； but it is without doubt an imperfection in
me not to make a good use of my freedom； and to give my
judgment readily on matters which I only understand obscurely。
I nevertheless perceive that God could easily have created me
so that I never should err； although I still remained free；
and endowed with a limited knowledge； viz。 by giving to my
understanding a clear and distinct intelligence of all things
as to which I should ever have to deliberate； or simply by His
engraving deeply in my memory the resolution never to form a
judgment on anything without havin