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kinds there is; properly speaking; truth or error to be found。
Of my thoughts some are; so to speak; images of the things;
and to these alone is the title 〃idea〃 properly applied;
examples are my thought of a man or of a chimera; of heaven;
of an angel; or 'even' of God。 But other thoughts possess
other forms as well。 For example in willing; fearing;
approving; denying; though I always perceive something as the
subject of the action of my mind;16 yet by this action I
always add something else to the idea17 which I have of that
thing; and of the thoughts of this kind some are called
volitions or affections; and others judgments。
Now as to what concerns ideas; if we consider them only
in themselves and do not relate them to anything else beyond
themselves; they cannot properly speaking be false; for
whether I imagine a goat or a chimera; it is not less true
that I imagine the one that the other。 We must not fear
likewise that falsity can enter into will and into affections;
for although I may desire evil things; or even things that
never existed; it is not the less true that I desire them。
Thus there remains no more than the judgments which we make;
in which I must take the greatest care not o deceive myself。
But the principal error and the monest which we may meet
with in them; consists in my judging that the ideas which are
in me are similar or conformable to the things which are
outside me; for without doubt if I considered the ideas only
as certain modes of my thoughts; without trying to relate them
to anything beyond; they could scarcely give me material for
error。
But among these ideas; some appear to me to be innate;
some adventitious; and others to be formed 'or invented' by
myself; for; as I have the power of understanding what is
called a thing; or a truth; or a thought; it appears to me
that I hold this power from no other source than my own
nature。 But if I now hear some sound; if I see the sun; or
feel heat; I have hitherto judged that these sensations
proceeded from certain things that exist outside of me; and
finally it appears to me that sirens; hippogryphs; and the
like; are formed out of my own mind。 But again I may possibly
persuade myself that all these ideas are of the nature of
those which I term adventitious; or else that they are all
innate; or all fictitious: for I have not yet clearly
discovered their true origin。
And my principal task in this place is to consider; in
respect to those ideas which appear to me to proceed from
certain objects that are outside me; what are the reasons
which cause me to think them similar to these objects。 It
seems indeed in the first place that I am taught this lesson
by nature; and; secondly; I experience in myself that these
ideas do not depend on my will nor therefore on myself¥for
they often present themselves to my mind in spite of my will。
Just now; for instance; whether I will or whether I do not
will; I feel heat; and thus I persuade myself that this
feeling; or at least this idea of heat; is produced in me by
something which is different from me; i。e。 by the heat of the
fire near which I sit。 And nothing seems to me more obvious
than to judge that this object imprints its likeness rather
than anything else upon me。
Now I must discover whether these proofs are sufficiently
strong and convincing。 When I say that I am so instructed by
nature; I merely mean a certain spontaneous inclination which
impels me to believe in this connection; and not a natural
light which makes me recognise that it is true。 But these two
things are very different; for I cannot doubt that which the
natural light causes me to believe to be true; as; for
example; it has shown me that I am from the fact that I doubt;
or other facts of the same kind。 And I possess no other
faculty whereby to distinguish truth from falsehood; which can
teach me that what this light shows me to be true is not
really true; and no other faculty that is equally trustworthy。
But as far as 'apparently' natural impulses are concerned; I
have frequently remarked; when I had to make active choice
between virtue and vice; that they often enough led me to the
part that was worse; and this is why I do not see any reason
for following them in what regards truth and error。
And as to the other reason; which is that these ideas
must proceed from objects outside me; since they do not depend
on my will; I do not find it any the more convincing。 For
just as these impulses of which I have spoken are found in me;
notwithstanding that they do not always concur with my will;
so perhaps there is in me some faculty fitted to produce these
ideas without the assistance of any external things; even
though it is not yet known by me; just as; apparently; they
have hitherto always been found in me during sleep without the
aid of any external objects。
And finally; though they did proceed from objects
different from myself; it is not a necessary consequence that
they should resemble these。 On the contrary; I have noticed
that in many cases there was a great difference between the
object and its idea。 I find; for example; two pletely
diverse ideas of the sun in my mind; the one derives its
origin from the senses; and should be placed in the category
of adventitious ideas; according to this idea the sun seems to
be extremely small; but the other is derived from astronomical
reasonings; i。e。 is elicited from certain notions that are
innate in me; or else it is formed by me in some other manner;
in accordance with it the sun appears to be several times
greater than the earth。 These two ideas cannot; indeed; both
resemble the same sun; and reason makes me believe that the
one which seems to have originated directly from the sun
itself; is the one which is most dissimilar to it。
All this causes me to believe that until the present time
it has not been by a judgment that was certain 'or
premeditated'; but only by a sort of blind impulse that I
believed that things existed outside of; and different from
me; which; by the organs of my senses; or by some other method
whatever it might be; conveyed thes